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INTRODUCTION
1

Cyberspace is the new frontier—the 21st century Brave New
World.2 While the Internet3 opens up a universe of new possibilities, who
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is the sheriff in this frontier town and what law should he apply? In
crafting the boundaries of the virtual world, historical legal precedent can
be both instructive and informative. Arguably one of the most famous
civil procedure cases to date is Pennoyer v. Neff.4 In this 1877 case, the
United States Supreme Court established that an individual is not bound
by the judgment of a specific court until and unless that court has
properly acquired authority over that individual.5 One important and
instructive principle underlying this decision is that a court’s power and
authority over an individual is limited by territorial boundaries.6 In
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized a federal constitutional limit
on the power a state court could wield, limiting it to a rigid system of
authority over only those persons or property located within a state’s
borders.7 In its approach to the territorial power of state courts, Pennoyer
assumed that each state was essentially a separate entity and that
interstate activity was the exception.8 Indeed, the Supreme Court initially
relied upon traditional notions of sovereignty adopted from international
law wherein states were treated like countries, each with exclusive
sovereignty over its own persons or property.9
Although Pennoyer prevailed for seventy years as the overarching
philosophy of the territorial limits of proper exercise of judicial power,
its rigidity and lack of foresight left many courts without guidance when
attempting to apply the traditional notion of jurisdiction to interstate
commerce. This became glaringly apparent with the railway boom during
1. See generally William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World
Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197 (1995). The term “cyberspace”
is sometimes treated as a synonym for the Internet and sometimes treated as a completely different,
and much broader, concept that emphasizes its treatment as a place. For purposes of this Note, I will
use the two interchangeably and to mean a notional environment in which communication and data
transfer over computer networks occurs.
2. See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (anticipating developments in
reproductive technology, psychological manipulation, sleep-learning, and classical conditioning that
drastically change in response to a profoundly different society in the 26th century characterized as a
densely imagined dystopian state).
3. See generally Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(illustrating one of the first instances in which a United States District Court attempted to describe
the basic infrastructure of the Internet). While the foundational structure of the Internet remains, the
Internet has evolved over the past two decades with changes including: reduction in expense to use,
reduction in technical challenge to log on, increase in amount of information and services provided,
etc. Id.
4. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5. Id. at 721–35.
6. HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL PROCEDURE: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 33 (2d ed.
2012).
7. Id. at 35.
8. Id.
9. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, BROOKE D. COLEMAN, DAVID F. HERR &
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 76 (2013).
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the last third of the nineteenth century, the birth of the automobile, and
the construction of interstate highways.10 It has become ever more
complicated with the invention of the airplane and the expansion of the
Internet.11 Just as the industrialization and mobilization of our nation
reduced the significance of state and national boundaries, those same
boundaries have become all but invisible with the rise of the Internet.12
Commentators agree that the “explosive growth of [the Internet] has
raised concerns about applying existing substantive and procedural
doctrine, both largely defined by geography, to a world without physical
borders.”13
Certainly, the post-Pennoyer era itself saw an expansion in case law
and a partial overruling14 of Pennoyer—rejecting the schema of
Pennoyer—with the decision of International Shoe v. Washington in
1945.15 In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court shifted
from an analysis of whether the defendant was present in the forum
state’s geographical boundaries to an examination of the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state.16 In Pennoyer, the Court stressed the
importance of sovereignty and territorial boundaries.17 By 1945,
however, the Court understood the need for a more abstract way of
determining whether exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant was proper.18 International Shoe’s “minimum contacts”
requirement allows states to exercise jurisdiction over individuals who
purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of the forum state, whether
or not that includes being physically present within the state’s territorial
boundaries.19
In 1980, the Court had an opportunity, in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,20 to examine the application of purposeful availment
to the ever-increasing modern mobilization of society, specifically the
automotive industry.21 In World-Wide Volkswagen, plaintiffs brought a
product liability suit in an Oklahoma state court against nonresident
10. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 45.
11. Internet Used by 3.2 Billion People in 2015, BBC (May 26, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32884867 [https://perma.cc/72R5-NJTA].
12. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 45.
13. Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Required on
the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 926 (1998).
14. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36.
15. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. Id. at 316–17.
17. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444. U.S. 286 (1980).
21. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 41.
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defendants for burns caused by a car fire in Oklahoma, from an
automobile purchased in New York.22 In a narrowly divided 5–4 decision
in favor of the defendants, the majority “made it clear that state lines still
matter, and a court’s power over an out-of-state defendant depends on
whether the defendant acted purposefully toward the forum state.”23 In a
vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the defendants knowingly
sold an inherently mobile product and that it is not unreasonable to hold
defendants answerable in a foreign state over a product that foreseeably
could have ended up and caused harm in that foreign state.24 Further,
Justice Brennan emphasized that personal jurisdiction “need not be so
restrictive in an era in which modern transportation and communication
reduce the inconvenience of litigating in another state.”25
While the nature of jurisdiction makes the implementation of a
bright-line test impractical, the dawning of the Internet age has posed
further dilemmas for the Court. These dilemmas and the inability to
reach a practicable, coherent solution have created a desperate need for
guidance from the Supreme Court or the Legislature to create, at the very
least, a federal standard or a single, clear test for determining proper
Internet jurisdiction.26 As it stands now, “[r]ecent cases interpreting the
jurisdictional effect of conducting business on the Internet have reached
opposite conclusions based on nearly indistinguishable facts.”27 Courts
have grappled with analyzing the extent to which a defendant’s Internet
presence constitutes minimum contacts with a forum state.28 Although
case law involving Internet jurisdiction is still sparse, “it is clear that the
federal circuits are employing different standards to determine personal
jurisdiction issues derived from Internet contacts.”29

22. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–91.
23. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 41.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See generally INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2014
INTERNET CRIME REPORT 4–48 (2014). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet
Crime Complaint Center, there were 269,422 complaints of Internet crime in the United States filed
in 2014—a 2.5% increase in cybercrime from 2013. See id. at 4. As of May 10, 2014, the Internet
Crime Complaint Center received its three millionth complaint since its inception in 2000. Id. The
complaints range from a wide variety of crimes affecting victims of all nationalities, ages,
backgrounds, educational levels and socio-economic levels. Id. at 5. These statistics further illustrate
the glaring prevalence of cybercrime in the United States, and the desperate need for a single test for
how examine cases in controversy that arise in cyberspace.
27. Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565,
565 (1999).
28. STEMPEL, supra note 9, at 117.
29. Richard P. Rollo, The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: It is Time for a Paradigm
Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 668 (1999).
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While various courts and numerous legal professionals have
addressed the issue of inconsistent application of personal jurisdiction in
cyberspace cases, the Supreme Court has yet to discuss the impact that
technology might have on the analysis of personal jurisdiction; thus,
many details remain unresolved.30 This Note examines the varying
jurisdictional splits between the lower district courts, the courts of
appeals, and the federal circuit court of appeals in determining the proper
approach to take when dealing with Internet jurisdiction. After an
examination of several key cases, this Note will explain why the
Supreme Court, or the Legislature, should adopt an expanded version of
the Ninth Circuit’s test in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,31 but with
one categorical limitation, in order to standardize the test for a state’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident Internet sites. This
solution merges two lines of thought and amounts to the creation of a
single standardized and clear objective rule that requires “something
more”—interactivity and commercialization—for non-tortious cases and
the inclusion of an additional limiting factor for tortious cases in
controversy. This solution fully comprehends the needs of the injured
party to be made whole and couples it with the need for “something
more” in order to satisfy a finding of proper personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in cyberspace.
Part I of this Note summarizes the traditional notions of general and
specific personal jurisdiction and their applications to the physical and
tangible. Part II discusses case law from several different United States
district and appellate courts, analyzing the key facts on which each
holding turns regarding the application of traditional jurisdiction. Part III
examines the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to further clarify proper cyberspace
jurisdiction in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. Part IV describes a
representative sample of the different approaches and solutions legal
scholars have posited to potentially solve the issue of how to properly
determine cyberspace jurisdiction. Part V sets forth a workable, useful
solution. Finally, the conclusion projects how the new approach will
effectively adapt to future advances in technology and the positive,

30. Jay C. Carle & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Civil Liberty on the Internet, AM. B. ASS’N (Jan.
2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_
magazine_index/civilliability.html [https://perma.cc/Z3DK-4WF2] (noting that the “harm caused by
Internet-related frauds, defective software, and the failure to adequately secure online data is increasing commensurate with our dependence on computers and the Internet” and that the “common law
must expand to perform its traditional function of allocating the burdens associated with risks of
harm so as to maximize social welfare, which includes both technological innovation and consumer
peace of mind”).
31. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997).

254

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:249

consistent, and stable effects a single, clear test would have on
cyberspace and the Internet.
I. TERRITORIAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION: FROM GENERAL
TO SPECIFIC
The U.S. judiciary does not have the power to adjudicate cases over
every person in the entire world.32 A court’s authority to rule over a
particular party—in other words, the territorial reach of a court’s power
over a particular party—is referred to as “personal jurisdiction.”33 The
law of personal jurisdiction, as it exists today, makes sense only if it is
viewed as a progression, with Pennoyer v. Neff as the starting point.34 As
described above, Pennoyer focused on territorial boundaries.35 After the
turn of the century and the mobilization of the nation in the 1890s, the
Court again addressed personal jurisdiction, redefining the conventional
test from an examination of a defendant’s physical presence in a state to
an evaluation of whether the defendant had the “minimum contacts” with
the state for jurisdiction to be fair and reasonable.36 In International
Shoe, the Court set forth its new interpretation that “due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”37 This standard
may be sufficiently met “by such contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation to defend that particular
suit which is brought there,”38 which includes “an ‘estimate of the
inconveniences’ the defendant would face in litigating away from
home.”39
The Court determined that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction could be
proper over a defendant in two ways: general and specific.40 General
jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s contacts with a forum are so strong
that a state’s courts could properly exercise authority over that defendant
for any and all claims, without regard for where the claims arose.41 For
32. STEMPEL, supra note 9.
33. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 31.
34. Id. at 32.
35. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725 (1877).
36. See ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36.
37. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
38. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 37–39.
41. Id. at 37.
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an individual defendant, general personal jurisdiction is based on his or
her domicile.42 If the defendant is a corporation, general personal
jurisdiction is based on some similar, strong presence within the forum.43
This standard ensures that every defendant is subject to the
general jurisdiction of a court in at least one forum.44
Regardless of whether or not a court can properly exercise general
personal jurisdiction over a defendant for all purposes, a court may be
able to properly exercise specific personal jurisdiction for a discrete
matter. Specific jurisdiction is proper for a particular lawsuit if the suit’s
claim arises out of the defendant’s contact with the forum state; this is
known as the minimum contacts test.45 Long-arm statutes—specific state
laws—are one such tool used to “empower courts to assert personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants,” allowing each court to extend
its reach beyond state lines.46 Long-arm statutes can be narrow,
enumerating the specific instances in which a state court can extend its
jurisdictional powers, or they can be broad, allowing the proper exercise
of jurisdiction by a state’s courts over a nonresident, so long as the
exercise does not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.47
In determining whether it can establish personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant under a long-arm statute, a court generally
employs the minimum contacts test, which may be applied using several
methods: purposeful availment, the effects test, business relationships,
stream of commerce, and reasonableness.48 The Supreme Court held in
Hanson v. Denckla that personal jurisdiction requires “some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself to the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.”49 Sometimes, however, the court determines
whether jurisdiction is proper by examining whether or not the
defendant’s out-of-state conduct causes effects in the forum state.50
Calder v. Jones reinforced the notion that a court has proper personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident so long as there are sufficient minimum
contacts.51
42. Id. at 38.
43. Id.
44. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 39.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 40.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 39–45.
49. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
50. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 42.
51. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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Other times, a court looks to the business relationships between the
parties to determine if jurisdiction is proper. In Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, the Supreme Court noted that, even without any physical
presence in the forum state, there can still be grounds for a proper
exercise of jurisdiction if there are sufficient business relations between
the parties in the forum state.52 In that case, the defendant was
headquartered in the forum and the parties contracted for the laws of the
forum to govern their contract.53
If the defendant is a manufacturer that never made contact with the
forum, the court can look to see whether or not the defendant placed
products into the stream of commerce—which may ultimately have
affected the interests of the forum state—to determine jurisdiction. Asahi
Metal Industry Company v. Superior Court of California is the Supreme
Court’s leading stream of commerce case, which, without a majority,
articulated three different standards for establishing the minimum
contacts requirement within the stream of commerce.54 Garnering four
votes, Justice O’Connor’s plurality concluded that “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”55 Her opinion
recognized the need for “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant,” such as
advertising or marketing directed toward the forum, before a finding of
proper jurisdiction could be made.56
Also winning four votes, however, Justice Brennan’s plurality
articulated that placement of a product into the stream of commerce by
the defendant with the mere awareness of the product’s distribution into
the forum state would be enough to satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement and allow the forum jurisdiction.57 Justice Stevens, writing
separately and joining neither plurality, suggested that “a regular course
of dealing [by a nonresident defendant] that results in
deliveries . . . annually over a period of several years” is conduct that
should rise to a level sufficient enough to meet the purposeful
availment, and thus the minimum contacts, requirement.58 Although only
a plurality, Justice O’Connor’s views of the stream of commerce have
“prevailed for jurisdictional disputes on the electronic stream of
commerce.”59
52. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–77 (1985).
53. Id. at 462.
54. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
55. Id. at 112.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Stravitz, supra note 13, at 932.
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The final portion of the traditional constitutional examination of
whether a forum’s exercise over a nonresident defendant is proper is an
inquiry into whether that jurisdiction is reasonable. The reasonableness
inquiry requires the court ask several questions: (1) how burdensome
would it be on the defendant to litigate the dispute in the forum; (2) how
strong is the forum’s interest in hearing the case (for example, if the
forum is the plaintiff’s home state); and (3) how strong is the plaintiff’s
interest in litigating in the forum (which may be persuasive if the dispute
arises there and implicates forum laws and policies).60 Notably, while the
reasonableness inquiry may be instructive, it is not always dispositive. In
Asahi, the Court determined it would be unreasonable to make the
nonresident defendant cross international waters to litigate the case—the
“reasonableness” standard was determinative.61 In contrast, the Court
determined in Burger King that while there existed a significant burden
for the defendant to litigate in Florida, the forum state and the plaintiff
had a stronger interest that outweighed the defendant’s burden.62
Although the Court has a long history of grappling with personal
jurisdiction as it applied to a modernizing society and what minimum
contacts were sufficient, “[w]ith the explosion of computers in the 80’s,
the question soon became what Internet contacts are sufficient to support
personal jurisdiction.”63
II. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS AT APPLYING TRADITIONAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION TO CYBERSPACE
Although the Internet is no longer a new phenomenon, and the
concept of claims arising out of conduct performed in cyberspace is no
longer novel, there remains no consistent standard for how to apply
traditional notions of personal jurisdiction to cyberspace cases.64 While
the United States Supreme Court has not discussed the impact that
technology may have on the application of jurisdiction to matters arising
from cyberspace, lower courts have explored this issue.65 Even so, the
cases66 that have been decided are all but consistent and showcase the
“courts’ struggle to conceptualize the nature of Internet contacts.”67
60. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 47.
61. Asahi Metal Indus. Corp., 480 U.S. at 114.
62. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
63. Rollo, supra note 29, at 678.
64. Id.
65. Betsy Rosenblatt, Principles of Jurisdiction, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y HARV. U., http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property99/domain/Betsy.html [https://perma.cc/
F7ZA-C8EA].
66. See generally ERIC GOLDMAN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 39, 39–52 (2014).
Professor Eric Goldman is a Professor of Law and Co-Director of the High Tech Law Institute at
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In translating the basic concepts of personal jurisdiction to the
Internet, courts have split on whether merely putting something on the
Internet—like launching a passive website or using a trademark on a
website—is enough to establish jurisdiction wherever the website is
received and consumed or whether “something more” is necessary. The
cases that seem to be most in line with traditional notions of “minimum
contacts” are those that rely on “something more” than merely the reach
of a passive website into a particular jurisdiction.
In CompuServe v. Patterson, the “something more” was that the
defendant knowingly entered into a contract with CompuServe (knowing
that CompuServe was an Ohio corporation) and knowingly used
CompuServe to fill software orders from its servers in Ohio.68
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Patterson “knowingly made an
effort—and, in fact, purposefully contracted—to market a product in
other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe operating, in effect, as his
distribution center. Thus, it is reasonable to subject Patterson to suit in
Ohio, the state which is home to the computer network he chose to
employ.”69 The court applied the traditional notion of the state long-arm
statute to examine if the Ohio court had proper personal jurisdiction, and
its holding turned on the fact that Patterson had entered into a contract
with, and continually sent his shareware software to, an Ohio company.70
Further, Patterson also repeatedly advertised to Ohio citizens through
CompuServe’s network.71 The Sixth Circuit articulated that contracting
with, repeated distribution of products to, and targeted advertisement of a
Company and a people of a foreign state are sufficient contacts to allow
that state to exercise proper personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.72
In Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., the “something
more” was that the defendant’s website required participants to submit
personal address information in order to receive a data service and,

Santa Clara University School of Law. His research and teaching focuses on Internet law,
intellectual property, and marketing law. He blogs on Internet matters at the Technology &
Marketing Blog, as well as the Tertium Quid Blog at Forbes. Professor Goldman has also taught on
topics related to Internet law at Marquette School of Law, University of California, Berkeley School
of Law, and the University of San Francisco School of Law. In the jurisdiction chapter of his book,
Professor Goldman examines several other unsuccessful attempts by the court to apply traditional
personal jurisdiction to cyberspace.
67. Rollo, supra note 29, at 679.
68. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1265.
71. Id. at 1264.
72. See generally id.
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thereby, the website operators targeted and knowingly transacted
business with residents of each participant’s state.73
Similar to the CompuServe court, the Zippo court adopted the
traditional application of a long-arm statute to claims arising through
cyberspace to determine if exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper.74
The district court had to determine (1) whether or not Zippo Dot Com
had sufficient “minimum contacts” to the forum; (2) if the claim asserted
against the defendant arose from those contacts; and (3) whether or not
exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.75 It noted that its threshold
for determining minimum contacts was whether or not the defendant
purposefully availed itself of the forum; in other words, whether the
defendant purposefully established contacts with the forum.76
In determining whether or not Zippo Dot Com met the threshold for
each of the three prongs, the court reasoned that Zippo Dot Com had: (1)
not just posted information on a Website that is accessible to
Pennsylvania residents who are connected to the Internet; (2) done more
than create an interactive website through which it exchanges
information with Pennsylvania residents in hopes of using that
information for commercial gain later; (3) contracted with approximately
3,000 individuals and seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania;
and (4) consciously chose to conduct business in Pennsylvania, pursuing
profits from the actions that are now in question.77
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, the “something more”
was that the defendant intentionally targeted the plaintiff as part of a
“scam” to make the plaintiff purchase a domain name from him; thereby,
directing its actions toward the plaintiff’s home state.78 The district court
found that “under the ‘effects doctrine,’ Toeppen was subject to personal
jurisdiction in California.”79 On appeal, Toeppen argued that the “district
court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over him because any
contact he had with California was insignificant, emanating solely from
his registration of domain names on the internet, which he did in
Illinois.”80
Due to the lack of guidance in both federal and common law, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to examine this question by

73. See generally Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
74. Id. at 1122.
75. Id. at 1122–23.
76. Id. at 1123.
77. Id. at 1125–27.
78. See Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320–22 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. Id. at 1318.
80. Id.
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applying California’s long-arm statue.81 The Ninth Circuit noted that the
defendant had to be domiciled in the forum state or the defendant’s
activities in the forum state had to be substantial or continuous and
systematic to find personal jurisdiction proper.82 Although the court did
not have general personal jurisdiction over Toeppen, as Toeppen was
neither domiciled in California nor were his activities in California
substantial or continuous and systematic, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding that it had specific personal jurisdiction.83
In determining whether the specific personal jurisdiction was
proper, the court applied a three-part test. First, the court asked whether
the nonresident defendant acted or consummated some transaction with
the forum state or performed some action by which the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum, thereby invoking the protections and benefits of the forum’s
laws.84 Second, the court examined whether the claim was one that arose
out of or resulted from the defendant’s activities as they relate to the
forum state.85 Third, the court examined whether the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction would be reasonable.86
The court found that (1) the purposeful availment prong was
satisfied by “the effects felt in California, the home state of Panavision,
from Toeppen’s alleged out-of-state scheme to register domain names
using the trademarks of California companies . . . for the purpose of
extorting fees from them”;87 (2) the claims asserted by Panavision arose
out of the defendant’s forum-related activities, namely that Panavision
would not have been injured and the suit not brought “but for” the
defendant’s conduct directed toward Panavision in California;88 and (3)
Toeppen failed to present a compelling case that the district court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him in California would be
unreasonable.89
Similar to Zippo, in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, the “something
more” was that the defendant’s site invited users to send and receive
information about services it offered, and the defendant company had
sent information to more than 100 users in the forum state.90 In its
81. Id. at 1320.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1321.
88. Id. at 1322.
89. Id. at 1324.
90. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp 1328, 1334–36 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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affirmation, the court noted that (1) CyberGold’s website was
operational; (2) the website provided information about CyberGold’s
new upcoming service; (3) the website explained that the forthcoming
service will maintain a mailing list of Internet users, presumably
including many residents of Missouri; and (4) CyberGold will provide
each user with a personal electronic mailbox and will forward to the user
advertisements that match the users selected interests.91 Put another way,
jurisdiction was properly exercised because CyberGold’s website
“invite[d] Missourians to put their names on CyberGold’s mailing list
and get up-to-date information about the company and its forthcoming
internet service,” and that through the website, CyberGold actively
solicited customers from Missouri for advertising.92
Viewing these cases together, it seems clear that “something more,”
although different in each case, constitutes some form of knowing or
purposeful exchange of data between defendant and plaintiff in the forum
state, rather than merely a one-way passive delivery of a website. While
these cases, taken in totality, provide some clarity as to what the
“something more” ought to be in cyberspace cases, courts remain
fractured on how to apply traditional personal jurisdiction to the Internet;
there is no single, useful test to guide the court on this issue.
III. A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: CYBERSELL, INC. V.
CYBERSELL, INC.
The disagreements and inconsistencies in the above cases illustrate
some of the variations among courts as to what constitutes sufficient
minimum contacts and what is the correct approach when dealing with
Internet jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit attempted to remedy this
inconsistency by articulating a clearer vision of what “something more”
really meant—commercialization and interactivity—with its 1997 ruling
in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.93 In Cybersell, the plaintiff was an
Arizona corporation (“Cybersell AZ”) that advertised commercial
services over the Internet under the service mark “Cybersell.”94 Cybersell
AZ brought a trademark infringement suit against an identically-named
Florida corporation (“Cybersell FL”) in the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona.95 The district court dismissed the case for lack
of personal jurisdiction, and Cybersell AZ appealed.96
91. Id. at 1330.
92. Id.
93. See generally Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
94. Id. at 415–16.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 415.
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The Ninth Circuit noted that to exercise specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in a manner consistent with due process, the
defendant must do “some act or consummate some transaction with the
forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking
benefits and protections.”97 The court further noted that the “claim must
be one which arises out of or results from defendant’s forum-related
activities, and exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.”98
The key facts examined by the appellate court included the
following: (1) Cybersell FL did nothing to encourage people in Arizona
to access its site; (2) no Arizonan except for Cybersell AZ “hit”
Cybersell FL’s website; (3) there was no evidence that any Arizona
resident signed up for Cybersell FL’s web construction services;
(4) Cybersell FL entered into no contracts in Arizona, made no sales in
Arizona, received no telephone calls from Arizona, earned no income
from Arizona, and sent no messages over the Internet to Arizona; (5) the
interactivity of Cybersell FL’s web page is limited to receiving the
browser’s name and address and an indication of interest; (6) signing up
for the service in Arizona is not an option, nor did anyone from Arizona
do so; and (7) no money changed hands on the Internet from (or through)
Arizona.99 The court summarized that, in short, Cybersell FL had
consummated no transaction, nor had it performed any act by which it
purposefully availed itself of any privilege of conducting activities in
Arizona.100 Since it did not invoke the benefits and protections of
Arizona law, jurisdiction in Arizona was not proper.101
The court held that, “Cybersell FL’s contacts are insufficient to
establish ‘purposeful availment.’ Cybersell AZ has thus failed to satisfy
the first prong of our three-part test for specific jurisdiction.”102 The
Cybersell opinion articulates a noticeably clearer vision of what
“something more” really means: interactivity and commercialization.
One commentator has suggested:
Under the rule set forth in Cybersell [sic], a court would decide
whether a website creates minimum contacts by examining the
degree to which the site is commercial and interactive, and the
degree to which the site is directed at citizens of the forum
state. The more interactive a site is (i.e. the more exchange of
97. Id. at 416.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 419.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 419–20.
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information is possible between the site and the user), and the more
commercial the site’s nature, the more likely a court is to find that
contact exists between the site owner and the distant user. Similarly,
the more the site is directed at an audience in the forum [state] or
designed to harm citizens of the forum state, the more likely a court
will be to find that purposeful availment has occurred.103

While a court should always take into account the degree of
interactivity—that is, the information exchanged—between the website
and its users in determining whether jurisdiction is proper, when the
website is engaging in commerce, the court should focus more on where
the goods or services are to be delivered. Although the Ninth Circuit’s
attempt at clarification is admirable, it is underinclusive in that it fails to
consider other claims of actions, such as tortious claims.
IV. PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF
CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION
Over the past decade commentators have suggested solutions to the
question of how to properly examine and apply the traditional notions of
personal jurisdiction to cyberspace. While the solutions are too numerous
to examine individually, the following is an examination of a
representative sample of the various posited solutions offered to solve
this very real problem.
In Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces,
author Darrel C. Menthe suggests the application of the theory of
international spaces: adding cyberspace to the list of “others” that
currently includes Antarctica, the high seas, and outer space.104
According to Menthe, the solution to the cyberspace jurisdiction problem
can be solved by recognizing cyberspace as an international space and
mandating that the nationality of the person uploading information or
data be the primary determining factor for the exercise of jurisdiction.105
Menthe postulates that because Antarctica, the high seas, outer space,
and cyberspace are all characterized by their lack of territorial borders,
the nationality of an explorer therein should be the primary principle in
establishing where personal jurisdiction is proper.106 Menthe concludes
that such a standard rule would “provide predictability and international

103. Rosenblatt, supra note 65.
104. Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, 4 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 69, 70 (1997).
105. Id. at 101–02.
106. Id.
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uniformity. It strikes a balance between anarchy and universal liability,
and it works.”107
Additionally, Richard P. Rollo proposes a federally regulated
approach to cyberspace jurisdiction and suggests the federal regulation
should be an adoption of the “cyberspace model.”108 Rollo’s cyberspace
model approach suggests that because there is no physical presence
associated with Internet contacts, all contacts must then exist in
cyberspace, and, as such, to assign a physical location to a web page,
website, or Internet interaction would be to engage in an arbitrary fiction,
which would lead to every state having jurisdiction over every individual
who used the Internet.109 For example, under Rollo’s interpretation, if an
individual in California contacts a website posted and maintained in New
York, contact occurred in neither California nor New York because all
contacts arising from cyberspace happen in cyberspace.110 Although
Rollo notes his solution would wreak havoc on the traditional model of
jurisdiction111 because it would deprive all courts of jurisdiction from the
Internet112 and claims arising therefrom, he posits that his solution of
federal regulation is “the simplest and most complete solution”113 to the
problem of cyberspace jurisdiction.
Yet, other commentators, such as Professor Julia A. Gladstone,
suggest that the proper solution to cyberspace jurisdiction is to use a
combination of the Calder “effects test” and the Zippo “sliding scale
test.”114 Professor Gladstone also suggests that there should be a showing
of specific intent to inflict damage to the plaintiff in the forum state, or
that contact to the forum state in question impacted at least a critical
mass of actual Internet viewers in the forum jurisdiction.115 In reaching
her solution, Professor Gladstone asserts that her combination of tests
would allow courts to shift away from territorial physical jurisdiction to a
modern, standardized rule based on the subject matter and the cause of
action for which the case arises.116 Professor Gladstone suggests the
court rely on two factors to indicate if a directed cause of action or a case
in controversy is directed to the forum state. These two factors are the

107. Id. at 102.
108. Rollo, supra note 29, at 693.
109. Id. at 693–94.
110. Id. at 693.
111. Id. at 694.
112. Id. at 693.
113. Id. at 694.
114. See generally Julia Alpert Gladstone, Determining Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The
“Zippo” Test or the “Effects” Test?, INFORMING SCI., 143 (June 2003).
115. Id. at 155.
116. Id.
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“selection of language” by which information between two parties is
communicated and the chosen choice of currency.117
While this representative sampling of posited solutions has its
strengths, the weaknesses far outweigh the strengths. Some of the
solutions are overinclusive, others are underinclusive, while still others
completely shift away from the notions and policies behind traditional
personal jurisdiction. Menthe’s suggestion to add cyberspace into the
international theory of spaces only works for international cyberspace
controversies; the problem of how to address cyberspace jurisdiction
within the United States still remains.118 Rollo’s position of adopting the
cyberspace model is unworkable in that it is not a solution at all. This
position deprives all courts the authority to adjudicate cases and
controversies arising from cyberspace activity,119 which leaves an even
bigger question for how to deal with cybercrimes,120 cyberterrorism,121
and cybertorts.122 This solution is further unworkable when its creator
unequivocally notes that its impact would wreak havoc on the questions
of cyberspace jurisdiction.123
117. Id. at 156.
118. See Menthe, supra note 104, at 101–02 (“[N]ationality is, and should be, the primary
principle for the establishment of jurisdiction [in cyberspace]. Such a rule [would] provide
predictability and international uniformity.”) (emphasis added).
119. See generally Jennifer Warnick, Digital Detectives: Inside Microsoft’s New Headquarters
for the Fight Against Cybercrime, MICROSOFT NEWS CTR., http://news.microsoft.com/
stories/cybercrime/ [https://perma.cc/RBS4-S42X] (noting about half of online adults were
cybercrime victims in 2012, cybercrime costs the global economy up to $500 billion annually, and
one in five small to medium sized businesses are targets of cybercrime). See also Microsoft,
Cybercrime by the Numbers, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OZigCFaxbyc [https://perma.cc/G9JA-T6Y4].
120. See generally Norton, What Is Cybercrime?, NORTON BY SYMANTEC,
http://us.norton.com/cybercrime-definition [https://perma.cc/XD8E-LACY]. While cybercrime
covers a wide range of different attacks, all deserve their own unique approach when it comes to
improving our computer’s safety and protecting ourselves, and cybercrime can be concisely defined
as “any crime that is committed using a computer network or hardware device.” Id. Cybercrimes
include Trojan horse viruses, phishing scams, bank and e-commerce fraud, cyberstalking,
harassment, extortion, blackmail, stock market manipulation, and complex corporate espionage. Id.
Further, cybercrime has now surpassed illegal drug trafficking as a criminal moneymaker, an
individual’s identity is stolen every three seconds as a result of cybercrime, and it only takes four
seconds for an individual’s computer to become infected once connected to the Internet. Id.
121. See generally Serge Krasavin, What is Cyber-Terrorism, COMPUTER CRIME RES.
CTR., http://www.crime-research.org/library/Cyber-terrorism.htm [https://perma.cc/THX9-UBND].
Cyberterrorism is the use of information technology and means by terrorist groups and agents. Id. In
defining the cyber terrorist activity it is necessary to segment action and motivation. Id. There is no
doubt that acts of hacking can have the same consequences as acts of terrorism, but in the legal sense
the intentional abuse of the information cyberspace must be a part of the terrorist campaign or an
action. Id. Other activities, so richly glamorized by the media, should be defined as cybercrime. Id.
122. Carle, supra note 30 (noting that cybertorts are harms that include financial injuries,
reputational damage, theft of trade secrets, and invasions of privacy).
123. Rollo, supra note 29, at 694.
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The most convincing solution is Professor Gladstone’s, which
would create a categorical system based on subject matter of the action
with specific guidance on how to determine proper personal jurisdiction
in cyberspace for each group-cause of action.124 The weakness of this
solution is in its practical application. The defining characteristic of
jurisdiction is the age-old notion of how to bring a lawsuit into a specific
court, whether it be federal or state, municipal or family, or bankruptcy
or drug court.
While there are certain areas of the law that are solely litigated in a
specific court, such as intellectual property claims and international law
claims, these are exceptions to the general rule. Usually, jurisdiction is
primarily viewed as an obstacle for plaintiffs in properly bringing a case
in a court with appropriate adjudicative authority over the defendant.
Therefore, the categorical nature of Professor Gladstone’s solution, while
potentially convincing, is not, on its own, a practical, feasible alternative
to the current personal jurisdiction regime.
V. A WORKABLE SOLUTION: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GOT IT RIGHT (AND WRONG)
While the Cybersell opinion articulates a clearer vision of what
“something more” really means—interactivity and commercialization—
it leaves more to be desired. The court in Cybersell implicitly applied the
O’Connor plurality test from Asahi Metal by subtly analogizing the
maintenance of a passive website with the placement of a material good
by a manufacturer into the stream of commerce and then articulating the
need for “something more” in order for the court of the forum state to
properly exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.125
Specifically, the court held that the mere presence of a passive website
on the Internet does not constitute the minimum contacts needed to
subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of every court and that
“something more,” either interactivity or purposeful direction, is
needed.126 While this test preserves the constitutional standards of fair
play and substantial justice, it is clear that the ruling as it stands remains
unsatisfactory as courts have continued to struggle with what “something
more” should be.127
Interactivity is easier to prove, such as in the case of online contract
formation, where assent is reached by a user populating specific fields
with their information and clicking an “I Accept” button. However, with
124. See Gladstone, supra note 114.
125. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417–19 (9th Cir. 1997).
126. Id.
127. See Rollo, supra note 29, at 679.
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the advent of the Internet, confusion emanated from how to handle
purposeful availment in cyberspace (i.e., interactive versus passive
websites). It is necessary to define a contemporary set of actions that are
sufficient to satisfy the “purposeful availment” prong of the minimum
contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction.
While Cybersell brings us one step closer to a viable solution for
determining when personal jurisdiction is proper for cases in controversy
that arise in cyberspace—that is, examining interactivity and
commercialization (the information exchange between the website and
the user, as well as whether the website has engaged in commerce)—it
fails to consider a gamut of other claims that could come before the
court. Thus, the Cybersell court fails to posit a solution that is entirely
useful.
One of the most significant categories of claims that the Cybersell
ruling fails to address are claims that arise in tort. When a claim is
tortious it is more reasonable for the court to focus on the plaintiff’s
domicile instead of examining fairness of a forum to the defendant. In
other words, focusing on decreasing the burdens placed on the injured
party particularly, if not specifically, when targeted by the intentionally
or negligently harmful actions of the defendant. While this solution is
similar to Professor Gladstone’s approach, it is not a categorical
approach to cyberspace jurisdiction either. Rather, it merely separates
tortious claims and gives the court specific direction to focus primarily
on the injured party rather than predominantly considering fairness to the
defendant.
The solution, while not initially apparent, becomes clearer after a
thorough examination and a piecing together of both previously posited
solutions and past case law. The “something more” that district courts
have been inconsistently struggling with for years is a melding of the
Cybersell ruling for non-tortious cyberspace claims with a categorical
approach for tortious cyberspace claims. This inclusive solution does not
abandon traditional notions of personal jurisdiction or the restraint of
hailing nonresidents into a foreign forum, but rather, it fully
comprehends the need to treat some claims differently than others. When
a website, or its owner, commits a tort against one of its users it does so
either intentionally or negligently, and the court should look to make the
injured party whole again. It should look to where that plaintiff is
domiciled in determining which court has the proper authority to exercise
jurisdiction over a tort-committing nonresident in cyberspace.
Either judicially or legislatively, the Court should adopt or
Congress should enact a single, clear objective test that combines the
Cybersell ruling of interactivity and commercialization for non-tortious
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acts with a focus on the injured party’s domicile for tortious cyberspace
acts. Put differently, the proposed solution would combine the nexus
between the exchange of information and commercial activity with a
limiting, categorical factor for tortious actions.
In our current system, jurisdiction is viewed mainly from the side of
the defendant.128 Even if the plaintiff or the forum has a strong interest in
litigating a case in a particular state—usually the plaintiff’s home
state—if a court finds that it would be too burdensome on the defendant
to litigate in that state, the court will either dismiss the case for lack of
personal jurisdiction without prejudice, or it may remove the case to
another jurisdiction with proper authority to adjudicate.129
Because torts, whether negligent or intentional, arise from a
wrongful act or an infringement of a right of the plaintiff by the
defendant, in this and only this category, the interest of the plaintiff
should be deemed more important than the burden on the defendant. In
other words, the injured party’s interest in obtaining effective and
convenient relief should far outweigh the burden on the tortious
defendant. In Tamburo v. Dworkin—an Internet tort case where the
defendants used their email lists and websites to encourage potential
customers to boycott the plaintiff’s business and harass him in
person130—the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois long-arm statute
conferred jurisdiction over the defendants because they had
(1) intentionally directed their communications to Illinois and
(2) indented harm to the plaintiff in Illinois.131
In Rusinowski v. Village of Hillside, the plaintiff brought a tort
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendant
for using phone calls and Internet contact to direct third parties to
commit other torts against the plaintiff.132 Similar to the Tamburo court,
the Rusinowski court held that maintaining jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant was proper because the defendant (1) waged a
campaign of harassment against the plaintiff in Illinois and (2) repeatedly
contacted local police and the plaintiff’s school in order to upset him and
potentially have him arrested or expelled.133 In both cases, the court
found that extending personal jurisdiction to a nonresident defendant,
when the case in controversy arose out of intentional tortious conduct
128. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasizing the importance
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the maintenance of a suit must not
offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
129. Id.
130. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700–01 (7th Cir. 2010).
131. Id. at 708–09.
132. Rusinowski v. Village of Hillside, 835 F. Supp. 2d 641, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
133. Id. at 655.
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over the Internet that was specifically targeted toward the plaintiff rather
than commercialization or interactivity, was proper and did not offend
the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice articulated in
International Shoe.134 Although the court considered the fairness of the
defendant as required by International Shoe, the court gave primary
consideration to the injured party’s domicile rather than to the
convenience of the defendant to litigate in that particular domicile
because the defendant specifically targeted and intentionally injured the
plaintiff.
Certainly this categorical, plaintiff-focused, limiting addition to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is not without precedent and should be
merged with the Ninth Circuit’s Cybersell, Inc. holding to make a new,
single, clear test for appropriate jurisdiction that is more applicable, more
complete, more inclusive, and most significantly, more useful.
CONCLUSION
While industrialization and mobilization gave rise to the railroad,
the automobile, the airplane, and the Internet, it also brought new
challenges of how to apply existing law to a novel phenomenon.135 Some
commentators suggest the growth of cyberspace changes everything
about sovereignty, the state, jurisdiction, and law, while other
commentators suggest the opposite.136 The adoption of the Ninth
Circuit’s test for jurisdiction set forth in the Cybersell, Inc. decision,
combined with a single categorical limitation for tortious actions, best
comports with the traditional notions set forth in Pennoyer and expanded
upon by International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen.137 The solution
suggested in this Note is not so much a novel invention as it is a carving
out where the single test is amongst a sea of inconsistency and
unpredictability at common law. It is not defining new ground, but rather
restating it and melding it into a test that is actually useful. The existing
lore is needlessly scattered, but when viewed as a whole and
retrospectively, each applies a similar standard. The solution posited
herein is a clearly restated, useable articulation of the spirit and intent of
that standard.

134. See generally Tamburo, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010). See also Rusinowski, 835 F. Supp.
2d at 655.
135. Internet Used by 3.2 Billion People, supra note 11.
136. Joel P. Trachtman, Cyberspace, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Modernism, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 561, 561–62 (1998).
137. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (narrowly
holding that foreseeability alone is insufficient for a court’s proper exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who has no other ties, contacts, or relations with the forum state).

